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09/991,249	11/16/2001	Shelton Louie	1205-010/JRD	1310
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IPSOLON LLP 111 SW COLUMBIA SUITE 710 PORTLAND, OR 97201			FISCHER, ANDREW J	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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DATE MAILED: 05/17/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/991,249

Applicant(s)

LOUIE ET AL.

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

### Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

### Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 03 October 2005.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

### Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-24 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 19-24 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-18 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

### Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

### Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

### Attachment(s)

- |  |   |
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| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)  | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)                                   | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)             |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)<br>Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____ | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____  |

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Acknowledgements***

1. Applicants' amendment filed March 9, 2006 is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 1-24 remain pending.
2. This Office Action, the "First Final Office Action" is given Paper No. 20060512.
3. The examiner for this application has changed. Please indicate Examiner Andrew J. Fischer as the Examiner of record in all future correspondences.
4. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of "Applicants" refers specifically the Applicants of record. References to lower case versions of "applicant" or "applicants" refers to any or all patent "applicants." Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to "Examiner" in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of "examiner" or "examiners" refers to examiner(s) generally.
5. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologies for these errors.

### ***Restriction***

6. Applicants' election of Group I (Claims 1-18) in the reply filed on October 3, 2005 is acknowledged. However because Applicants did not distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the restriction requirement as required by 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b), the election has been treated as an election without traverse. See MPEP §818.03(a).

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7. Claims 19-24 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b) as being drawn to a nonelected Invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim.

Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on October 5, 2005.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103***

8. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

9. Claims 1-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Wallace et al in view of Garber et al. Wallace et al teach an apparatus and method of verifying that a prescribed drug is properly dispensed from a pharmacy comprising the steps of: receiving an order for a prescribed drug (see, for example, col. 7, lines 54-65); tagging a prescription container with a first code for identifying the prescribed drug (see col. 8, lines 32-58); positioning a supply container (20) of a drug near the prescription container, wherein the supply container bears a second tag with an assigned code (see col. 8, lines 32-58); and automatically comparing the identity of the prescribed drug with the identity of the drug in the supply container (see col. 8, lines 32-58). It is inherent that the codes are stored in internal memory.

10. Wallace does not teach the use of wireless tags. Garber teaches a system of tracking the location and identity of items by comparing a code of a wireless RFID tag in a defined area around a tag reader to a known code (see col. 17, lines 3-21). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to employ the teachings of Garber

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et al with the invention of Wallace et al to use wireless RFID tags to compare assigned codes because wireless RFID tags can be read at any orientation.

11. Wallace et al do not teach the step of flagging a discrepancy. However, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to employ the step of flagging a discrepancy to prevent the wrong drug from being dispensed. Furthermore, transducers, lights, and audio speakers are all common means of notification, and it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to employ transducers, lights, or audio speakers to notify a person of the discrepancy, because such means are easily noticed.

12. Moreover, it is the Examiner's factual determination that bar code tags and radio frequency ("RF") tags are art recognized equivalents. See MPEP §2144.06. Both bar code tags and RF tags are used for the same purpose: conveying information about the article to which the tags are attached to a reader machine. Additionally, one of ordinary skill in the art recognizes that the selection of either a bar code tag over an RF tag (or vice versa, RF tag over a bar code tag) is not enough to distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art since both devices are recognized as interchangeable depending upon their intended use or the particular environment in which the tag will be used. See MPEP §2144.07. Evidence to support these conclusions includes but is not limited to Rakars et. al. (U.S. 6,763,996 B2); Keys et. al. (U.S. 6,758,403 B1); Monico (U.S. 6,557,758 B1); McAllister (U.S. 6,415,978 B1); Helton et. al. (U.S. 6,357,662 B1); Maloney (U.S. 6,232,876 B1); Wurtz et. al. (U.S. 5,838,253); Rupport et. al. (U.S. 5,640,002); Kewin (U.S. 5,595,356); Eberhardt (U.S. 5,328,784); and Scribner et. al. (U.S. 4,688,026).

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13. It is the Examiner's factual determination that there are at least three (3) basic types of RF tags: passive RF tags, active tags without a battery, and active tags with a battery. See e.g. *Ghaem et. al.* (U.S. 5,495,250) C1, L45 to C2, L24 for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these three (3) types of tags.

14. After careful review of the specification and prosecution history, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It is the Examiner's position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

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In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation . . . .” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate<sup>2</sup> the claim limitation at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined. Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).<sup>3</sup> The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

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<sup>2</sup> “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

<sup>3</sup> See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptiontronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

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Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, it is the Examiner's position that the above requirements are reasonable.<sup>5</sup> Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

15. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim

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<sup>4</sup> See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability . . . . [Emphasis added.]”

<sup>5</sup> The Examiner's requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner's requirements are simply an express request for clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at [www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm](http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm) (last accessed May 14, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> While most definition(s) are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.



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terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

**Automatic** “1 a : largely or wholly involuntary;” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition, Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, M.A., 1997.

**Server**: “2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client.” Computer Dictionary, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.<sup>8</sup> **Client**: “3. On a local area network or Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” Id. **Computer**: “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” Id.

16. Because the Examiner has used (or pointed to) the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (as noted above) to help support his interpretation of at least one claim term (see *e.g.* “automatically” above) and because patent applicants frequently misunderstand the historical order of definitions, homographs, and their corresponding senses in a given entry, the following excerpts from the “Explanatory Notes” in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary are provided:

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<sup>7</sup> See *e.g. Brookhill-Wilk 1 LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

<sup>8</sup> Based upon Applicants’ disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See *e.g. Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its

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**Entries****HOMOGRAPHS**

The order of homographs is usually historical: the one first used in English is entered first.

**Definitions****DIVISION OF SENSES**

A boldface colon is used in this dictionary to introduce a definition. . . . It is also used to separate two or more definitions of a single sense. . . . Boldface Arabic numerals separate senses of a word that has more than one sense. . . . Boldface lowercase letters separate the subsenses of a word. . . . Lightface numerals in parentheses indicate a further division of senses. . . .

**ORDER OF SENSES**

The order of senses within an entry is historical: the sense known to have been first used in English is entered first. This is not to be taken to mean, however, that each sense of a multisense word developed from the immediately preceding sense. It is altogether possible that sense 1 of a word has given rise to sense 2 and sense 2 to sense 3, but frequently sense 2 and sense 3 may have risen independently of one another from sense 1.

When a number sense is further subdivided into lettered subsenses, the inclusion of particular subsenses with a sense is based upon their semantic relationship to one another, but their order is likewise historical: subsense 1a is earlier than subsense 1b, 1b is earlier than 1c, and so forth. Divisions of subsenses indicated by lightface numerals in parentheses are also in historical order with respect to one another. Subsenses may be out of historical order, however, with respect to the broader numbered senses. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, pp 10a-20a.

17. Thus, the order of definition(s), homograph(s), or sense(s) for a given entry in a dictionary is not relevant when determining the appropriateness of the definition because the order is primarily historical.
18. Additionally, functional recitation(s) using the word “for” or other functional terms (*e.g.* “for verifying that a prescription drug is properly dispensed” as recited in claim 1) have been

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appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

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considered but given less patentable weight<sup>9</sup> because they fail to add any steps and are thereby regarded as intended use language. A recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in additional steps. See *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc.*, 246 F.3d 1368, 1375-76, 58 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where the language in a method claim states only a purpose and intended result, the expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim.).

### ***Response to Arguments***

19. Applicants' arguments filed March 9, 2005 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

20. Regarding the phrase "if said first code and said second code indicate different drug identities," the phrase has been considered but because it is optional (i.e. "if"), it does not narrow the claims because it can always be omitted. Applicants are reminded that optional or conditional elements do not narrow the claims because they can always be omitted. See *e.g.* MPEP §2106 II C: "Language that suggest or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed or does not limit a claim to a particular structure does not limit the scope of a claim or claim limitation. [Emphasis in original.]" and *In re Johnston*, 77 USPQ2d 1788, 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("As a matter of linguistic precision, optional elements do not narrow the claim because they can always be omitted."). The Examiner suggests removing "if" phrases if a positive recitation is desired.

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<sup>9</sup> See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight).

***Conclusion***

21. This action is made final. Applicants are reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire three months from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within two months of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the three-month shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than six months from the mailing date of this final action.

22. References considered pertinent to Applicants' disclosure are listed on form PTO-892. All references listed on form PTO-892 are cited in their entirety.

23. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner or other USPTO official, the following four (4) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") apply to this Office Action *and* any future office action(s), communication(s), or other correspondence provided by the USPTO: MPEP citations to Chapter 2300 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 4, October 2005; citations to Chapters 200-900, 1200-1400, and 1700-1900, 2100, 2200, 2600 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 3, August 2005. MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 1000, 1100, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. MPEP citations to Chapters 1600, 2300, 2400 are from MPEP 8<sup>th</sup> Edition, August 2001.

24. This application is a continuation-in-part ("CIP") application of U.S. application no. 09/715,039 filed on March 16, 2000 ("Parent Application"). See MPEP §201.06. In accordance with MPEP §609 A. 2 and MPEP §2001.06(b) (last paragraph), the Examiner has reviewed and

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considered the prior art cited in the Parent Application. Also in accordance with MPEP §2001.06(b) (last paragraph), all documents cited or considered ‘of record’ in the Parent Application are now considered cited or ‘of record’ in this application. Additionally, Applicants are reminded that a listing of the information cited or ‘of record’ in the Parent Application need not be resubmitted in this application unless Applicants desire the information to be printed on a patent issuing from this application. See MPEP §609 A. 2. Finally, Applicants are reminded that the prosecution history of the Parent Application is relevant in this application. See *e.g.*, *Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.*, 357 F.3d 1340, 1350, 69 USPQ2d 1815, 1823 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that statements made in prosecution of one patent are relevant to the scope of all sibling patents).

25. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

26. Applicants are reminded that patents are written by and for skilled artisans. See *e.g. Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. American Science and Engineering, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 804, 53 USPQ2d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“patents are written by and for skilled artisans”).<sup>10</sup> The Examiner therefore starts with the presumption that Applicants are skilled artisans who possess at least ordinary skill in the art. Consequently, it is the Examiner’s position that because the patent

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<sup>10</sup> See also *S3 Inc. v. nVIDIA Corp.*, 259 F.3d 1364, 1371, 59 USPQ2d 1745, 1749-50 (Fed. Cir. 2001)( “patents are written for persons experienced in the field of the invention”).

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references of record are directed to those with ordinary skill in this art, these references are clear, explicit, and specific as to what they teach. Nevertheless some applicants apparently have difficulty understanding the references. In an effort to maintain compact prosecution, provide due process, and to help these applicants understand the contents of a reference when viewed from the position of one of ordinary skill in this art, Applicants are hereby given actual notice that if after reasonably reading any reference of record—whether the reference is currently of record or subsequently made of record—if Applicants can not reasonably understand or if Applicants have difficulty comprehending one or more sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principle(s) set forth in the reference(s), Applicants should (in their next appropriately filed response) bring this issue to the attention of the Examiner. In addition to bringing this issue to the attention of the Examiner, and in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b), Applicants' response must also state *why* they either do not understand or *why* they have difficulty comprehending the offending reference(s). If after properly receiving (*i.e.* Applicants' response is made of record) both Applicants' request for understanding and the reasons as to *why* the request is made—and assuming the reference is germane to at least one outstanding rejection—the Examiner may either provide a substitute reference, or alternatively, do his best to elucidate the particular sentence(s), statement(s), diagram(s), or principles(s) in the offending reference. For all documents or references made of record after this Office Action, Applicants are given actual notice that this paragraph becomes effective when Applicants receive notice that the document or reference is made of record (*i.e.* this paragraph becomes applicable when Applicants submit an Information Disclosure Statement or when Applicants receive an examiner's Notice of References Cited (Form PTO-892)).

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27. Additionally, Applicants are reminded that it is inappropriate for the USPTO to disregard any relevant evidence of record. “It is jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence on any issue in any case, patent cases included.” *Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.*, 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Second, when making substantive patentability determinations, the USPTO uses the preponderance of the evidence standard.<sup>11</sup> In light of this standard, it is clear error for the USPTO not to consider *all* evidence of record. See *e.g. In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471, 223 USPQ 785, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“All the evidence on the question of obviousness must be considered.”); *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on *the totality of the record*, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument. [Emphasis added.]”); *In re Glaug*, 283 F.3d 1335, 1338, 62 USPQ2d 1151, 1152-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(“Patentability vel non is then determined on the *entirety* of the record, by a preponderance of evidence and weight of argument. . . . ; patentability is determined by a preponderance of *all* the evidence. [Emphasis added.]”); and *In re Rinehart*, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143, 146 (CCPA 1976)(where the court expressly set forth the issue as “Whether, in light of *all the evidence*, the claimed method would have been obvious at the time the invention was made. [Emphasis added.]”). Third, any factual determination by the USPTO that does *not* consider all relevant evidence of record may not be

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<sup>11</sup> See MPEP §706 I. “The standard to be applied in *all* cases is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ test. In other words, an examiner should reject a claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is more likely than not that the claim is unpatentable. [Emphasis added.]”

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supported by the required substantial evidence<sup>12</sup> since the particular evidence *not* considered may be probative of a factual issue presented. Forth, prior art patents are not technical treatises and therefore these patents intentionally omit features that are known in the field of the invention. See *S3 Inc. v. nVIDIA Corp.*, 259 F.3d at 1371, 59 USPQ2d at 1749-50 (“The law is clear that patent documents need not include subject matter that is known in the field of the invention and is in the prior art, for patents are written for persons experienced in the field of the invention. ... To hold otherwise would require every patent document to include a technical treatise for the unskilled reader.”); and *Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc.*, 198 F.3d 1374, 1382, 53 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(“The specification would be of enormous and unnecessary length if one had to literally reinvent and describe the wheel.”). Finally and perhaps most importantly, it is well established that “[a] reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention ‘such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in *combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention*. [Emphasis in original.]’” *In re Graves*, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 USPQ2d 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995) citing *In re LeGrice*, 301 F.2d 929, 936, 133 USPQ 365, 372 (CCPA 1962) and noting that regarding the claimed “simultaneously monitoring the selected multiple connection points,” the prior art “nevertheless anticipates [the claimed invention], even if it does not specifically disclose simultaneous monitoring of the output points, if simultaneous or parallel monitoring is within the knowledge of a skilled artisan.” *Graves*, 69 F.3d at 1152, 36 USPQ2d at 1701.<sup>13</sup> Therefore

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<sup>12</sup> See *In re Gartside*, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315, 53 USPQ2d 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000) where the Federal Circuit concluded that USPTO’s factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence.

<sup>13</sup> See also *In re Donohue*, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 USPQ 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the same statement of law and also citing *In re LeGrice*; and *Ex parte Thomson*, 24 USPQ2d 1618, 1620



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because, *inter alia*, it is inappropriate for the USPTO to disregard any relevant evidence, because the USPTO must consider all evidence of record, because any evidence or record *not* considered by the USPTO may be probative of at least one factual issue presented, because prior art patents need not include subject matter that is known in the field of the invention, and because anticipation is determined by the teachings of a reference in combination with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, Applicants are hereby given actual notice that all prior art rejections (*i.e.* rejection(s) based upon 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103)—if found in this Office Action or any subsequent office action—are based upon the cited reference(s) in the statement of the rejection in combination with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art.

28. Because this application is now final, Applicants are also reminded of the USPTO's after final practice as discussed in MPEP §714.12 and §714.13 and that entry of amendments after final is *not* a matter of right. "The refusal of an examiner to enter an amendment after final rejection of claims is a matter of discretion." *In re Berger*, 279 F.3d 975, 984, 61 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Furthermore, suggestions or examples of claim language provided by the Examiner are just that—suggestions or examples—and do not constitute a formal requirement mandated by the Examiner. Unless stated otherwise by an express indication that a claim is "allowed," exemplary claim language provided by the Examiner to overcome a particular rejection or to change claim interpretation has *not been addressed* with respect to other aspects of patentability (*e.g.* §101 patentable subject matter, §112 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph written description and enablement, §112 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph indefiniteness, and §102 and §103 prior art). Therefore, any claim amendment submitted under 37 C.F.R. §1.116 that

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(B.P.A.I. 1992).

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incorporates an Examiner suggestion or example or simply changes claim interpretation will nevertheless require further consideration and/or search and a patentability determination as noted above.

29. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work, Millennium Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, Millennium Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is general knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see e.g. “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the references’ basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

30. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicants for their “Remarks” (beginning on page 6) traversing the Examiner’s positions on various points. If Applicants disagree with any additional factual determination or legal

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conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,<sup>14</sup> the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner's position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in their next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (571) 272-6779. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Alexander Kalinowski, can be reached at (571) 272-6771. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (571) 273-8300.



Andrew J. Fischer  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 3627

AJF  
May 14, 2006

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<sup>14</sup> E.g., if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.